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1 Introduction
It is often argued that a high market transparency is desirable for society as
it fosters competition. How exactly a certain level of market transparency is
achieved remains typically somewhat unclear. In this paper, we propose a model
where the level of market transparency is endogenously determined. Moreover,
an implication of typical argumentation, of course, is that the higher the mar-
ket transparency, the higher the social welfare is. Interestingly, we conclude
the opposite; in our set up the socially optimum would require lower market
transparency than the private market solution entails.
We put forward a standard model of price competition, where the consumers
behaviour is not captured by the demand curve. They can also decide to ac-
quire information on announced prices. They get to know the prevailing prices
only if they acquire the price information. Our model replicates the standard
Bertrand competition case when transparency, i.e., the proportion of consumers
who are informed, is at the highest level. With both informed and uninformed
consumers the rmspricing is in mixed strategies. The novelty with respect to
prior literature is that the degree of market transparency is endogenous as also
consumers are allowed to behave strategically.
In our set up rms compete in prices, produce a homogeneous good, and have
the same marginal costs of production. It is costly for consumers to become
informed about prices. A consumer who acquires price information can, of
course, choose the lowest price o¤er. The higher the proportions of informed
consumers the lower the prices are in equilibrium. Thus, those consumers who
do not get informed also benet, but only on average. We show that there exists
symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium in prices with a monotonic relationship
between the degree of market transparency and intensity of competition.
Most interestingly, we nd numerically multiple equilibria with zero, low and
high levels of market transparency with the high level of market transparency
being the stable equilibrium. When comparing the stable equilibrium with the
social optimum, it turns out somewhat surprisingly that the social optimum
would require less transparency than there is in equilibrium. That is, there is
too much private investments in information acquisition.
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Of course, we are not the rst ones to address market transparency. Varian
(1980) is probably the pioneering study. In his model the consumers are identi-
cal, while we allow for heterogeneous valuations. There is also an old research
agenda of increased market transparency leading to intensied market compe-
tition (see Stigler (1961)) as increased transparency improves the consumers
possibilities to choose goods with lowest prices. However, on the downside
of increased transparency is the rms improved possibility for collusion in a
repeated relationship as increased transparency makes it easier to detect any
deviations from collusive pricing.
For recent contributions, see for instance Møllgaard and Overgaard (2001)
and (2002), Nilsson (1999) and Schultz (2005). While the prior literature has
examined the e¤ects of transparency on pricing, intensity of competition and
welfare we fully endogenize the level of market transparency by introducing the
consumersstrategic behavior in an otherwise standard model of price competi-
tion. Moreover, our nding of multiple equilibria of market transparency is new
in the literature.
In search theoretic framework Lester (2009) nds that while rms are capacity-
constrained the relationship between transparency and prices is not as clear as
prior theoretical literature has argued. In particular, higher transparency can
lead to either higher or lower prices. Schultz (2004) analyzes the e¤ects of market
transparency in a Hotelling model where a fraction of consumers are informed
about the prices and locations of rms. He shows that increased transparency
leads to unambiguous improvement in consumersand total welfare. Our wel-
fare results with respect to transparency and consumerswelfare are in line with
those of Schultz (2004) while we demonstrate that the e¤ect of increased trans-
parency on total welfare is ambiguous. Namely, at high levels of transparency
the gain of consumers from increased transparency is smaller than the loss in
the rmsprots leading to decrease in total welfare.
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2 The Basic Setup
Consider a mass of consumers normalized to unity. Assume that their valuations
of a homogenous commodity are independent draws from the uniform distribu-
tion on unit interval. Once the valuations are realized there is a linear demand
curve q = 1  p. Notice that other distributions would, of course, generate dif-
ferent demand curves. Assume further that there are two rms which produce
a homogenous good with constant marginal cost normalized to zero. Let us call
these rms A1 and A2. Below we denote the proportion of those consumers
who have observed the rmsannouncements by ; and this is intended to be a
measure of market transparency. That is, proportion 1    of consumers have
observed nothing, and will visit the rms randomly.
To construct an equilibrium we assume that consumers use a symmetric
mixed strategy. The rmsbehaviour is then necessarily symmetric.
Denition 1 An equilibrium is a proportion  2 [0; 1] of observing consumers
and prices p1 and p2 s.t. no consumer wants to deviate and the prices maximize
the rmsprots.
3 Price Competition: Symmetric Equilibrium
Consider the price competition where the rms A1 and A2 announce their prices
p1 and p2 simultaneously, and assume further that proportion  of consumers
observe the announced prices. In a symmetric equilibrium both rms then get
1 
2 consumers to start with, and they compete for the  consumers. If the rms
compete in prices in a Bertrand-fashion it is clear that for  > 0 there does not
exist a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium for exactly the same reason as in
the standard Bertrand-competition case.
There, however, exists a symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies and that
is what we construct next. The support of the mixed strategy F is a closed
interval

p; p

and it has no mass points (see Kultti and Virrankoski, 2003 for
the reasoning and proof in an analogous case). It is clear that the highest price
is never higher than the monopoly price. Also, it cannot be lower since when
5
a rm chooses the highest price it only gets the non-observing consumers and
might as well charge them the monopoly price.
Assume that A2 uses F and that A1 chooses price p from the support of the
mixed strategy. A1s prot is then
F (p)
1  
2
(1  p)p+ (1  F (p))

1  
2
+ 

(1  p)p: (1)
This magnitude must be constant for all p in the support of the mixed strategy.
In particular, it must equal the prot at the monopoly price pm = 12 . Notice
that at this price F (pm) = 1. Equating (1) and the prot of A1 at the monopoly
price yields the following formula for the mixed strategy
F (p) =
4(1 + )(1  p)p  (1  )
8(1  p)p : (2)
To determine p notice that F
 
p

= 0. Now equating the monopoly prot and
the prot at p yields the following condition
p2   p+ 1  
4(1 + )
= 0: (3)
The sensible root is
p =
1 
q
2
1+
2
(4)
as the other root is greater than the monopoly price. To summarize we have
the following result:
Proposition 2 There exists an equilibrium where prices are on the interval
p; p

;and where p =
1 
q
2
1+
2 and p =
1
2 :
That is, when  = 1 the lower limit p is at the competitive level with two
rms, and at  = 0 the lower limit p is at the monopoly level of a single rm.
Thus, we have a nice and smooth transition from the monopoly price to the
competitive price in a duopoly when the proportion of the informed consumers
goes from zero to unity. The intensity of market competition is thus increasing
in market transparency and quite naturally consumers are then also better o¤
due to the lower prices. Let us next examine consumersincentives to become
informed about announced prices in the rst place.
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4 Transparency in Equilibrium
Assume that consumers have to pay a xed cost of  to become informed about
the rmsposted prices. We want to nd the equilibrium proportion of con-
sumers who decide to become informed. In equilibrium the consumers must be
indi¤erent between observing the prices and not observing them.
First we determine the expected utility of a consumer who does not incur
the cost of becoming informed. He chooses one of the rms at random and the
expression for his utility isZ pm
p
Z v
p
(v   p)f(p)dpdv +
Z 1
pm
Z pm
p
(v   p)f(p)dpdv: (5)
The above expression gives the consumers expected utility when the rm
has set price p which happens with probability f(p): In (5) the rst part is the
expected utility of the consumer whose valuation v is on the interval [p; pm],
and when the price p set by the rm lies in the interval [p; v]: Notice that in the
consumers valuation the lower limit of integral starts from p instead of zero,
since all those consumers whose valuation is lower than p will not buy the good
and thus receive zero. The second part of (5) gives the consumers expected
utility when his valuation is at least the monopoly price. Thus, in the rst
integral the upper limit hits the maximum valuation of v = 1:
After some routine algebra (executed in Appendix 1) expression (5) can be
developed into form
=
1  
16
24 2
1 
q
2
1+
  2 + 2 ln(1 
r
2
1 + 
)
35 : (6)
Consider next the case when consumers can learn the announced prices. By
paying  a consumer observes the prices announced by A1 and A2, and then
gets to choose the lower price, i.e., he gets to choose the lower of two identically
distributed random variables. The probability g(p) that the lower of the two
prices is p is
g(p) = 2f(p) (1  F (p)) = (1  )(1  2p)
4(1  p)2p2

(1  )
8(1  p)p  
1  
2

: (7)
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Now the expected utility of a consumer who observes the prices can be expressed
as follows Z pm
p
Z v
p
(v   p)g(p)dpdv +
Z 1
pm
Z pm
p
(v   p)g(p)dpdv   : (8)
By paying  a consumer becomes informed about the prices and chooses
the lowest one, i.e., price p: Otherwise the expression of the expected utility
remains the same as in (5). After some rather involved but routine algebra (see
Appendix 2) equation (8) turns out to equal
(1  )2
162
244(
q
2
1+ )
2   3
q
2
1+
2(1 
q
2
1+ )
2
  2 ln(1 
r
2
1 + 
) +
1
4
ln
1 
q
2
1+
1 +
q
2
1+
35  :
(9)
In equilibrium a consumer must be indi¤erent between observing and not
observing the prices which condition determines the equilibrium value of . That
is, by equating (6) and (9) one should in principle be able to solve . It should
not come as a surprise that it is impossible to solve such  in a closed form. We
solve the model numerically, and present graphics for the expected utilities.
Assuming that the cost of getting informed, , takes values in the set
f0; 0:02; 0:05g we can plot (6) and (9) in the same picture.
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Figure 1: Observers (dashed) and unobservers (solid) expected utilities at 
=0:05:
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Figure 2: Observers (dashed) and unobservers (solid) expected utilities at 
=0:02:
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Figure 3: Observers (dashed) and unobservers (solid) expected utilities at 
=0:
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We can summarize the results with di¤erent levels of cost of getting informed,
, as follows:
Proposition 3 There is always an equilibrium where no-one observes. When
 >  there is a unique equilibrium where no-one observes. When  2 (0; ]
there are multiple (three) equilibria with zero, low and high levels of market
transparency i.e. where  2 [0; 1). If  = 0 there exists two equilibria with
either  = 0 or  = 1:
Somewhat surprisingly it turns out that there are multiple equilibria. On
reection this is easy to understand; what matters to a consumer is the marginal
utility from observing the prices. When very few consumers observe the price it
does not pay to observe the price since the support of the rmsmixed strategy
is not very large, and thus getting the lower of the two prices results in not-so-big
reduction in the price. When many consumers observe the price the support of
the mixed strategy is large and getting the lower price results in a big reduction
in the price. Of the two equilibria where  > 0; the one of higher transparency
is the stable equilibrium. Notice that there is also a third equilibrium where no
one invests in getting informed, and then  = 0: Quite naturally when the cost
of getting informed  increases it does not pay to become informed any longer,
and thus the curve representing the expected utility of an observing consumer
moves downwards.
5 Welfare
To determine how the market equilibrium fares compared to the social optimum
we postulate that the social welfare measure is the sum of prots and consumer
surplus. This is easy to calculate as proportion  of consumers gets the expected
utility in expression (9) and proportion 1  gets the expected utility in expres-
sion (6). There are also two rms both of which make the same expected prot
which is the same as the prot at the monopoly price (since it belongs to the
support of the mixed strategy). Formally, the social welfare measure is
11
24 (1  )2
162
0@4(
q
2
1+ )
2   3
q
2
1+
2(1 
q
2
1+ )
2
  2 ln(1 
r
2
1 + 
) +
1
4
ln
1 
q
2
1+
1 +
q
2
1+
1A  
35+
+(1  )
241  
16
0@ 2
1 
q
2
1+
  2 + 2 ln(1 
r
2
1 + 
)
1A35+ 1
4
(1  ): (10)
Which can be consolidated into the following form
(1  )2
16
264
q
2
1+
2

1 
q
2
1+
2 + 14 ln 1 
q
2
1+
1 +
q
2
1+
375   + 1
4
(1  ): (11)
The graph of the social welfare measure (11) shows that welfare is a concave
function, increasing in transparency  till a unique maximum is reached and
decreasing thereafter (the latter with positive cost of getting informed) as seen
in gure 4. Increase in the cost of obtaining information  shifts the tail of the
curve downwards, here plotted at values 0, 0:01, 0:02 and 0:03.
Taking the rst order condition of the welfare function with respect to 
yields the following condition for the social optimum
1  
16
264 2
1 
q
2
1+
2
(1 + )
 
q
2
1+ (1 + )
2

1 
q
2
1+
2   1 + 4 ln 1 
q
2
1+
1 +
q
2
1+
375  1
4
= 0
(12)
It is of some interest to compare the privately chosen stable equilibrium
with high level of market transparency p with that of the welfare maximizing
s chosen by the social planner. Since from (12) it is impossible to solve  in
a closed form we use instead numerical analysis and solve both the private and
social optimum and compare those.
Assuming the cost of getting informed will take values 0, 0:01, 0:02 and 0:03;
we can solve the private equilibrium value of transparency, p by equating (6)
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Figure 4: Total utilities at  values 0 (solid); 0:01 (dashed); 0:02 (dot-dashed);
0:03 (dotted).
and (9). Similarly by plugging in (12) di¤erent values of  we can derive the
socially optimal level of transparency, s: These values are reported below in
table 1.
Table 1: Comparison of privately chosen equilibrium p and welfare
maximizing s
 = 0 p = 1 s = 1
 = 0:01 p = 0:97 s = 0:92
 = 0:02 p = 0:90 s = 0:82
 = 0:03 p = 0:74 s = 0:72
We nd that for all positive values of  (up to  after which no one observes)
there is too much market transparency in the optimal private market solution
compared to social optimum. The intuition behind this result is that for low
levels of transparency the gain of consumers from increased transparency ex-
ceeds the loss in the rmsprots, as shown in gure 5. However, at higher
13
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Figure 5: Growing consumers surplus at  f0; 0:01; 0:02; 0:03g and declining
prots.
values of transparency the loss in the rmsprots outweighs the increase in
consumerswelfare. The gure shows that if at low levels of  the slope of the
curves representing the consumerswelfare is bigger in absolute terms than of
rmsprots, then the situation is the opposite at higher values of transparency.
Thus, if the social planner assigns equal weight to the well-being of both rms
and consumers, then socially optimal level of market transparency is lower than
that of privately optimal. Note also that if rmsprots decreased non-linearly
in transparency, then the result would change depending on the relative decrease
of the rmsutility compared to that of consumers.
Proposition 4 The private and socially optimal levels of market transparency
coincide only when the cost of getting informed is zero. For all other values of
 the optimal private market solution involves too much transparency.
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6 Conclusion
We have developed a model of endogenous transparency where it is costly for
consumers to get informed about the prices announced by the rms. We show
that there is a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium that we derive explicitly.
We demonstrate that there is a monotonic relationship between the degree of
transparency and intensity of competition; the prices and prots decrease from
monopoly level to competitive level as transparency increases from zero to per-
fect transparency. It is clear that there always exists an equilibrium, if nothing
else then an equilibrium where no-one acquires information. Numerical analysis
reveal that there exist multiple equilibria (exactly three) with zero, low and high
levels of market transparency. Zero and high levels of transparency are stable
equilibria whereas the low level is unstable.
Quite surprisingly, it turns out that the stable equilibrium with strictly pos-
itive transparency entails higher than socially optimal level of information ac-
quisition. The market solution features too much transparency. This nding
is contrary to the results in the papers mentioned in the introduction. It also
runs counter to the often mentioned requirements to increase transparency in
various markets, the nancial markets being the leading example.
There are two reasons for too high transparency in equilibrium. One is that
the agentsdecision to acquire information makes price competition more erce,
and lowers the prots of the rms. As prots are part of the welfare it may
well go down. The other reason emanates from the fact that the analysis is of
partial equilibrium type. In a general equilibrium model the consumers would
also be the owners of the rms and the rmsprots would be distributed to
the consumers. Taking into account these general equilibrium e¤ects might well
change the result.
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Appendix 1: Derivation of expected utility of unin-
formed consumer.
Z pm
p
Z v
p
(v   p)f(p)dpdv +
Z 1
pm
Z pm
p
(v   p)f(p)dpdv
It is useful to change the order or integration as follows
=
Z pm
p
Z pm
p
(v   p)dvf(p)dp+
Z pm
p
Z 1
pm
(v   p)dvf(p)dp
=
Z pm
p
.
pm
p (
1
2
v2   pv) +
.
1
pm
(
1
2
v2   pv)

f(p)dp
=
Z pm
p

1
2
pm
2   1
2
p2   ppm + p2 + 1
2
  1
2
pm
2   p+ ppm

f(p)dp
=
1
2
Z pm
p
(1  p)2f(p)dp:
Now we can substitute in f(p) = F
0
(p)
=
1
2
Z pm
p
(1  p)2 (1  )(1  2p)
8(1  p)2p2 dp:
=
1
2
(1  )
8
Z pm
p
(1  2p)
p2
dp
=
(1  )
16
Z pm
p
(
1
p2
  2
p
)dp
=
(1  )
16
.
pm
p
( 1
p
  2 ln p)
after substituting pm = 1
2
and p =
1 
q
2
1+
2
we have
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=
(1  )
16
24 2
1 
q
2
1+
  2 + 2 ln(1 
r
2
1 + 
)
35
Appendix 2: Derivation of expected utility of informed
consumer
Z pm
p
Z v
p
(v   p)g(p)dpdv +
Z 1
pm
Z pm
p
(v   p)g(p)dpdv   :
Again it is useful to change the order or integration as follows
Z pm
p
Z pm
p
(v   p)dvg(p)dp+
Z pm
p
Z 1
pm
(v   p)dvg(p)dp  
We forget  for a moment and develop the the rst two expressions. As in the case
of the uniformed consumer we get the following expression
=
1
2
Z pm
p
(1  p)2g(p)dp:
recalling that g(p) = 2f(p)(1  F (p)) we get
1
2
Z pm
p
(1  p)2 (1  )(1  2p)
4(1  p)2p2

(1  )
8(1  p)p  
1  
2

dp
=
1
2
(1  )2
82
Z pm
p
(1  2p)
p2

1
4(1  p)p   1

dp
Now we can develop
Z pm
p
(1  2p)
p2

1
4(1  p)p   1

dp
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further on in the following form
Z pm
p

(1  p)
p2

1
4p(1  p)   1

dp 
Z pm
p
p
p2

1
4p(1  p)   1

dp
=
Z pm
p
1
4p3
dp 
Z pm
p
1  p
p2
dp 
Z pm
p
1
4p2(1  p)dp+
Z pm
p
1
p
dp
=

  1
8p2
+
1
p
+ ln p+
1
4p
  1
4
ln p+
1
4
ln(p  1) + ln p
pm
p
Plug in above
pm = 1
2
p =
1 
q
2
1+
2
and then solve the expression, and one gets the following expression for the payers
expected utility where the multiplier (1 )
2
162
and the cost of getting informed,  are
reintroduced
(1  )2
162
244(
q
2
1+
)2   3
q
2
1+
2(1 
q
2
1+
)2
  2 ln(1 
r
2
1 + 
) +
1
4
ln
1 
q
2
1+
1 +
q
2
1+
35  :
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